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Data breaches at private companies have occurred with 
increasing regularity in recent years, causing the exposure 
and theft of confidential consumer data, such as credit card 
numbers. Despite these alarming patterns, the current state of 
the law does not fully regulate the complicated issues that 
arise from data breach incidents. The existing regulations 
operate in a piecemeal manner and do not adequately address 
the situation. They give inadequate protections to consumers 
and insufficient guidance to private companies that 
experience breaches and other institutions affected by data 
breaches, such as credit card companies and banks. This is 
the data breach problem: the increasing frequency of data 
breaches in recent years coupled with the lack of appropriate 
legal response. 
Given the current situation, consumers are fighting back 
by filing class action lawsuits against private companies that 
have experienced data breaches. They have generally been 
unsuccessful, however, because many courts are reluctant to 
grant standing due to the lack of an identifiable injury, 
especially in cases where plaintiffs allege increased risk of 
future harm from misuse of their stolen personal information. 
This has especially been true after Clapper v. Amnesty 
International USA, one of the most recent U.S. Supreme 
Court cases on Article III standing. Despite frequent 
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dismissals and confusion about Clapper’s implications in the 
district courts, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
granted standing based on victims’ reasonable allegations of 
increased risk of future harms in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus 
Group, LLC. 
This Note aims to demonstrate why the Seventh Circuit’s 
approach is the best among the current decisions of the courts 
of appeals. Lessening the burden of standing requirements for 
consumer plaintiffs in data breach cases gives plaintiffs a 
potential avenue for relief, which is especially appropriate 
since there are inadequate regulatory and legislative 
mechanisms protecting consumers in data breach situations. 
In addition, the Seventh Circuit’s approach is a step towards 
an ultimate solution, which this Note suggests should be in 
the form of comprehensive federal regulatory framework. The 
Seventh Circuit’s approach allows for more cases to proceed to 
trial, and presumably for more companies to be held 
responsible for the consumer harm resulting from data 
breaches. This will allow for the responsibility for data 
security to be shifted to companies, which will hopefully 
shatter the current status quo and lead to a better solution. 
Though the Seventh Circuit’s approach is appropriate given 
the current context, this Note recognizes that there are 
nonetheless a variety of complications in its practical 
application. These complications reveal the complexity of the 
data breach problem and lend further support to the 
proposition that the solution to the data breach problem will 
likely be regulatory, not judicial, in nature. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Data breaches at private companies have occurred with 
increasing regularity in recent years. A data breach is “the 
loss, theft, or other unauthorized access . . . to data 
containing sensitive personal information, in electronic or 
printed form, that results in the potential compromise of the 
confidentiality or integrity of the data.”1 When data breaches 
occur at private companies, sensitive consumer data is often 
compromised and exposed. Despite this pattern, the current 
state of the law cannot fully address the complicated issues 
that arise from data breach incidents. The existing 
regulations operate in a piecemeal manner and do not 
 
1 38 U.S.C. § 5727 (2012). 
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adequately address the situation. They give inadequate 
protections to consumers and inadequate guidance to private 
companies that experience breach and to other institutions 
affected by data breaches of private companies, such as 
credit card companies and banks. 
Consumers are fighting back by filing class action 
lawsuits against companies that have experienced data 
breaches. They have generally been unsuccessful, however, 
because many courts are reluctant to grant standing due to 
the lack of an identifiable injury, especially in cases where 
plaintiffs allege increased risk of future harm from misuse of 
their stolen personal information. This has been especially 
true after Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,2 one of the 
most recent U.S. Supreme Court cases on Article III 
standing. Despite frequent dismissals and confusion about 
Clapper’s implications in the district courts, the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Remijas v. Neiman 
Marcus Group, LLC granted standing based on victims’ 
reasonable allegations of increased risk of future harms.3 
This is not true of data breach actions brought in other 
circuits, however. In the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, for instance, the stringent standing requirements 
remain a barrier to litigation for data breach victims.4 
The lack of appropriate legal redress for the increasingly 
common occurrence of data breaches described above is what 
this Note refers to as the “data breach problem.” In order to 
address the data breach problem, this Note argues that an 
overarching federal regulatory framework is ultimately 
needed. However, the Seventh Circuit’s decision is a step in 
the right direction, since conferring standing in data breach 
cases properly recognizes consumer harm in data breach 
situations. The Seventh Circuit’s approach provides 
consumer plaintiffs a vehicle to address their injuries, which 
is especially important considering the lack of available 
regulatory or legislative remedies. In so doing, plaintiffs will 
 
2 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
3 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015). 
4 See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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be able to demonstrate the merits of their cases and the 
complexity of these issues to the courts, which will allow 
courts to rule in favor of plaintiffs in some instances. 
Hopefully, growing numbers of companies held liable 
without enforcement of clear standards for negligence will 
pressure the government to create an overarching regulatory 
solution. In other words, the Seventh Circuit’s approach is 
one step—and the best one available thus far—towards 
solving the data breach problem. 
In sum, this Note endeavors to show that the Seventh 
Circuit’s approach is the best option among the courts of 
appeals’ decisions, but also details potential complications in 
its application which further support the need for an 
ultimate regulatory solution to the data breach problem. 
Part II briefly summarizes the current state of the law on 
data breaches. Part III discusses judicial standing 
requirements, including an analysis informed by Clapper v. 
Amnesty International USA. In addition, the Note briefly 
analyzes the effect of Clapper in the district courts and 
introduces Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group LLC, the first 
post-Clapper court of appeals decision on data breach. 
Lastly, Part IV argues that the Seventh Circuit’s approach is 
the appropriate one given the current legal context and 
recognizes some of its practical complications in application. 
In conclusion, this Note argues that the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision to put the onus for data protection on companies will 
hopefully shatter the current status quo and lead to a better 
solution to the data breach problem. This Note ultimately 
suggests that a comprehensive, federal regulatory 
framework is a possible solution to the data breach problem. 
II. THE DATA BREACH PROBLEM 
A. The Prevalence of Data Breach Today 
Incidents of data breach in recent years include 
household names such as Michaels (2.6 million payment 
cards), Sally Beauty (280,000 credit and debit cards), New 
York State (22.8 million private records of New Yorkers 
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taken over eight years), Dairy Queen (600,000 debit and 
credit cards), Home Depot (56 million credit and debit cards), 
Jimmy John’s (216 stores), JPMorgan Chase (76 million 
households and 7 million small businesses), and Sony 
(47,000 social security numbers, which were exposed more 
than 1.1 million times on 601 publicly-posted files stolen by 
hackers).5 Data breaches now occur with increasing 
regularity and have become commonplace.6 
Data breaches can occur in a variety of ways, but the case 
law of attempted and successful data breach class actions 
reflects three major categories: hacking, physical theft, and 
point-of-sale attacks.7 Hacking is the type of data breach 
that people are probably most familiar with—essentially, it 
“involve[s] hackers accessing a company’s network and 
stealing personal information.”8 Physical theft of company 
materials is another way data can be breached; this usually 
occurs when devices capable of data storage such as backup 
disks or laptops are stolen.9 
Lastly, data can be stolen through point-of-sale attacks, 
generally associated with credit cards.10 This can happen 
during the brief moment when an individual’s credit card 
information is recorded and processed at the time of 
purchase. Though systems vary, generally when a customer 
gives credit card information to a merchant company for a 
transaction, the merchant company reads and stores the 
 
5 Bill Hardekopf, The Big Data Breaches of 2014, FORBES (Jan. 13, 
2015, 7:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/moneybuilder/2015/01/13/the-
big-data-breaches-of-2014/ [https://perma.cc/A469-97T4] (listing data 
breach incidents in 2014). 
6 See Martin Giles, Defending the Digital Frontier, ECONOMIST (July 
12, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21606416-compa 
nies-markets-and-countries-are-increasingly-under-attack-cyber-criminals 
[https://perma.cc/9PMR-L9UN]. 
7 Andrew Hoffman, 2 Years of Clapper: Takeaways From 12 Data 
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card information necessary to initiate the transaction.11 This 
information is transmitted to the merchant’s acquiring bank, 
and the bank will use the information to verify the 
customer’s account balance through a high-speed credit card 
network (such as Visa or MasterCard) to ensure the 
customer has enough money or credit to advance the draw 
needed to complete payment.12 In some systems, such as 
with American Express or Discover, these steps are merged 
into one, since these companies are “single card-issuing 
institutions with a direct relationship with the merchant.”13 
Through this process, the card’s information is transmitted 
from the consumer to the merchant company, from the 
merchant company to the merchant company’s acquiring 
bank, and then again through the credit card network back 
to the card-issuing bank.14 
If any institution at any step of this long chain of 
transactions is compromised, consumers’ data may be 
exposed.15 In addition, this chain of custody raises complex 
legal questions about who is obligated to whom. The 
contractual obligations are muddled when data is passed 
along multiple relationships: “card-issuing bank–customer, 
customer–merchant, merchant–acquirer bank, acquirer 
bank–card network, card network–card-issuing bank, or in 
the alternative, card-issuing bank–customer, customer–
merchant, and merchant–integrated card network bank.”16 
Though the number of data breaches of private companies 
continues to grow with alarming speed, the law has not yet 
adequately addressed this issue. This is what is referred to 
as the “data breach problem” in this Note—the increasing 
frequency of data breaches in recent years coupled with the 
lack of appropriate legal response. Part II.B will demonstrate 
 
11 R. Andrew Patty II, Credit Card Issuers’ Claims Arising From 
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how the complexities described above play out on the current 
legal landscape. 
B. Laws Governing Data Breach: State and Federal 
Laws 
The legal issues that arise in data breach cases, such as 
determining who is at fault, the appropriate standards, and 
the remedy, are governed by a variety of laws from different 
law-making authorities.17 The applicable laws for any given 
situation generally come from both the state and federal 
governments.18 Some of these laws address issues specific to 
data breaches and the attendant increased risk of fraudulent 
use of stolen information, while others generally govern the 
protection and storage of information by private companies.19 
Any given data breach situation is subject to an array of 
regulations, but the lack of standardization or enforcement 
of these measures is alarming. Considering how pervasive 
and serious the data breach problem has been over the past 
few years, the current regulatory scheme is an untenable 
state of affairs. 
After a data breach occurs, a company generally takes 
steps to remedy the situation, and these steps depend on the 
laws or regulations applicable to the specific situation. 
Currently, there are many different relevant law-making 
authorities, each playing a critical but confused role in 
attempting to solve the problem. First, companies have to 
follow state data breach notification laws, which vary from 
 
17 See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE NEW LAWSUIT 
ECOSYSTEM: TRENDS, TARGETS AND PLAYERS 102–03 (2013), http:// 
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/web-The_New-Lawsuit-
Ecosystem-Report-Oct2013_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/GGP2-57HG]; see also 
ADVISEN, THE LIABILITY OF TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES FOR DATA BREACHES 4 
(2010), https://www.advisen.com/downloads/Emerging_Cyber_Tech.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2X32-RM8A] (indicating that there is no uniform 
standard for data security). 
18 See Rachael M. Peters, Note, So You’ve Been Notified, Now What? 
The Problem with Current Data-Breach Notification Laws, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1171, 1178, 1181 (2014). 
19 See Patty, supra note 11, at 8–9. 
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state to state.20 As of December 2015, forty-seven states had 
data breach laws.21 The existing state laws impose different 
requirements, some mandating that companies under certain 
circumstances inform their customers that their personal 
information may have been exposed due to a data breach 
within a certain amount of time.22 
Second, companies must also comply with numerous 
federal laws. The federal law framework is more industry-
related than consumer-oriented.23 One of the best examples 
of this is the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), which protects healthcare 
information by imposing data protection requirements upon 
relevant actors, such as healthcare and health plan 
providers.24 Though extensive, HIPAA exclusively applies to 
specific healthcare information because it protects only 
 
20 See Peters, supra note 18, at 1174–75. 
21 Alabama, New Mexico, and South Dakota are the only states that 
did not have data breach laws as of December 2015. See 2015 Security 
Breach Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 31, 
2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/2015-security-breach-legislation.aspx#2015 [https://perma.cc/ 
7ZAU-K3BM]; see also Peters, supra note 18, at 1181 & n.71. 
22 See Peters, supra note 18, at 1181–83. 
23 See id. at 1181; see also Adam R. Foresman, Note, Once More Unto 
the [Corporate Data] Breach, Dear Friends, 41 J. CORP. L. 343, 346 & n.25 
(2015) (describing the “sectoral” approach of federal law, which breaks 
down laws according to type and use of data, and citing U.S. CHAMBER 
INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 17, at 102). 
24 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 
USC § 1320d (2012); see also The HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/ 
privacy/ [https://perma.cc/7TW3-T2XB] (“The HIPAA Privacy Rule 
establishes national standards to protect individuals’ medical records and 
other personal health information and applies to health plans, health care 
clearinghouses, and those health care providers that conduct certain 
health care transactions electronically. The Rule requires appropriate 
safeguards to protect the privacy of personal health information, and sets 
limits and conditions on the uses and disclosures that may be made of 
such information without patient authorization. The Rule also gives 
patients rights over their health information, including rights to examine 
and obtain a copy of their health records, and to request corrections.”). 
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“individually identifiable health information.”25 While there 
are other applicable federal laws on data security, they do 
not directly address the issue at hand—where data breaches 
at private companies cause consumer information to be 
exposed and maliciously used in fraudulent ways. In 
addition, these laws are not often utilized to help protect 
consumers.26 The existing federal laws that could potentially 
provide private rights of action against corporations are 
subject to a variety of limitations and exceptions that render 
them toothless. For example, the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (“CFAA”) provides a civil cause of action that could 
theoretically be utilized in a typical data breach case.27 
However, this cause of action has rarely been successfully 
used to protect consumer victims of data breaches because it 
requires a showing of substantial economic harm in order to 
be applied to a typical data breach case.28 
 
25 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
§ 262(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d(6), 1320d-6(a) (2012); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 3 (2003), 
http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/privacysummary.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/5NWS-CV3C]; see also Peters, supra note 18, at 1179–80. 
26 See, e.g., P. Scott Ritchie, Security Breach Cases Under Federal 




27 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2012). 
28 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i) (2012); see also Peters, supra note 18, at 
1178. There are five different ways to bring a civil action under this 
statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2012) (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 
1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I)–(V)). However, only the first situation is facially 
applicable to a typical data breach situation (“loss to 1 or more persons 
during any 1-year period . . . aggregating at least $5,000 in value”). Even 
so, proving damages of $5000 or more is generally not possible in most 
consumer data breach cases. The other four situations that allow for civil 
action are generally inapplicable to a typical consumer data breach 
situation in which data is stolen from a compromised merchant company: 
(II) the modification or impairment, or potential modification or 
impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 
or more individuals; (III) physical injury to any person; (IV) a threat to 
public health or safety; and (V) damage affecting a computer used by or for 
an entity of the United States Government in furtherance of the 
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In addition, there is a scattered regulatory scheme in 
place as well by agencies such as the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”).29 The federal 
government has not yet released a manual or comprehensive 
set of regulations to help corporate management navigate all 
of the relevant cybersecurity and data security 
recommendations and requirements across all federal 
agencies.30 In short, these laws cause confusion because the 
current state of affairs is a patchwork of laws that have been 
created to meet discrete needs within the larger data breach 
problem. Moreover, it is clear that the current limited 
regulatory systems are ill suited for the fast-changing nature 
of data breach, typical of problems intertwined with 
technological innovations. 
The major federal agencies that give guidance regarding 
data security preparedness for most corporations include the 
SEC, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the FCC, the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”).31 None of these guidelines are 
mandatory, but they help acquaint corporate boards to the 
standards their corporations should meet by communicating 
the preferences of government regulators.32 A Commissioner 
of the SEC referred to the “Framework for Improving 
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” released by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) in 
February 2014, as a reference for corporate boards.33 In 
 
administration of justice, national defense, or national security. See 18 
U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i) (2012). 
29 Thad A. Davis, Michael Li-Ming Wong & Nicola M. Paterson, The 
Data Security Governance Conundrum: Practical Solutions and Best 
Practices for the Boardroom and the C-Suite, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
613, 629 (2015). 
30 See id. at 627. 
31 See id. at 629. 
32 See id. at 627. 
33 Id. at 630; see also NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK 
FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY (2014), http:// 
www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214-
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/GBE9-3H37]. 
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addition, the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and 
Examinations released a sample list of requested 
information that it plans to use in cybersecurity 
investigations.34 Although these guidance documents are not 
mandatory, agencies such as the SEC are signaling that 
companies should follow these rules in order to be viewed 
favorably if they become the subject of an investigation.35 
The SEC’s actions impact the way plaintiffs structure their 
suits and how corporations operate. Essentially, though not 
enforced as mandatory, the SEC’s guidance documents have 
an impact in the larger corporate field.36 
In 2006, the FTC created the Division of Privacy and 
Identity Protection (“DPIP”) to protect consumer data.37 This 
is most relevant in the context of big data collection. The 
DPIP has ordered companies to establish and maintain 
privacy protection programs and procedures and has settled 
enforcement actions with several big companies.38 In 
addition, the FTC released its own data security compliance 
guidelines in 2007, entitled “Protecting Personal 
Information: A Guide for Business.”39 
Contrastingly, the FCC has not attempted to set industry 
standards like the SEC and the FTC. However, due to the 
scope of its regulatory powers, the FCC was involved in a 
major case against two telecommunications companies in 
October 2014 for their failure to secure the private data of 
private individual customers.40 The FCC announced a $10 
million fine for the companies in that case.41 
 
34 See Davis et al., supra note 29, at 630. 
35 See id. at 631. 
36 See id. at 632. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 633; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING PERSONAL 
INFORMATION: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/system/ 
files/documents/plain-language/bus69-protecting-personal-information-gui 
de-business_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/SD6H-8AC5]. 
40 Davis et al., supra note 29, at 634–35 & n.59. 
41 Id. 
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The DOJ also plays a role in prosecuting criminals in 
data breach cases, shaping cybersecurity legislation, and 
working with the private sector in the data security realm.42 
In 2014, the DOJ took its first steps into the cybercrime 
world by establishing its Cybersecurity Unit.43 It remains to 
be seen what role the DOJ will play—because of 
jurisdictional issues, federal prosecutors cannot effectively go 
after criminals working abroad who are hacking and trading 
the personal information of Americans stolen from American 
companies.44 The best they can do is issue a notice, or in 
some cases, an arrest warrant, to the international 
community and petition for extradition, which can 
sometimes bring a criminal defendant into the United States 
for trial.45 In recent months, the DOJ Cybersecurity Unit, in 
partnership with DHS, has been actively giving guidance in 
the cybersecurity realm.46 Some of their recommendations 
provide protections for private companies that share 
information about potential threats with the federal 
government, which may be applicable in certain data breach 
cases.47 
Lastly, DHS is also involved in this field in a limited way, 
by recognizing the importance of data security in the context 
of national security. DHS announced its intent to enhance 
cooperation and coordination with the private sector, given 
 
42 Cybersecurity Unit, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/ 
criminal-ccips/cybersecurity-unit [https://perma.cc/4RN7-HRPG] (last 
updated Feb. 25, 2016). 
43 Davis et al., supra note 29, at 635 & n.61. 
44 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public 
Affairs, Russian National Charged in Largest Known Data Breach 
Prosecution Extradited to United States (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www. 
justice.gov/opa/pr/russian-national-charged-largest-known-data-breach-
prosecution-extradited-united-states [https://perma.cc/H3KS-BKPD]. 
45 See, e.g., id. 
46 This is specifically with regard to the Cybersecurity Information 
Sharing Act of 2015. See Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS), U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY: U.S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM, 
https://www.us-cert.gov/ais [https://perma.cc/5D3J-6HMQ]. 
47 Id. 
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that the private sector owns and operates over eighty-five 
percent of the nation’s critical cyber infrastructure.48 
III. THE DIFFICULTY OF GRANTING STANDING IN 
DATA BREACH CASES 
A. Article III Standing Requirements 
In order to bring a lawsuit in federal court, a plaintiff 
must have standing. In data breach cases, many plaintiffs 
have not been able to meet the standing requirement. 
District courts across the country have often imposed a high 
bar, often dismissing these cases before they even get 
through the door. 
The standing requirement comes from Article III of the 
U.S. Constitution.49 In order to bring a “case or controversy” 
in a federal court, the plaintiff must satisfy three elements of 
standing: 
First, the plaintiff must have “suffered an ‘injury in 
fact’––an invasion of a legally protected interest.” 
The injury complained of must be “actual or 
imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Second, 
a plaintiff’s claim must arise from an injury that 
“fairly can be traced to the challenged action of a 
defendant.” Third, a favorable court decision must be 
able to redress the plaintiff’s injury. The plaintiff 
bears the burden to establish all three elements.50 
In data breach cases, the most difficult element to 
establish is the “injury in fact” requirement. First of all, 
many courts will not recognize that there is an injury at all 
for the individual consumer in data breach cases because 
many credit card companies and financial institutions will 
refund and void fraudulent purchases up to a point as a 
 
48 Davis et al., supra note 29, at 637 & n.68. 
49 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
50 Patricia Cave, Comment, Giving Consumers a Leg to Stand On: 
Finding Plaintiffs a Legislative Solution to the Barrier from Federal 
Courts in Data Security Breach Suits, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 765, 772 (2013) 
(citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). 
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matter of industry practice. Since the individual consumer 
technically may not face monetary harm, courts have had a 
difficult time identifying a cognizable injury.51 
In addition, courts are wary of claims about possible 
future injury. Generally, district courts have not recognized 
consumer complaints about the increased threat of identity 
theft.52 However, the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and 
Ninth Circuits have found standing due to the increased 
threat of future harm in some cases.53 Two notable cases in 
these circuits are Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp and 
Krottner v. Starbucks Corporation.54 In Pisciotta, a class 
action suit against a bank, the Seventh Circuit found that 
“an act which harms the plaintiff only by increasing the risk 
of future harm” was sufficient to confer standing when the 
increase in risk was caused by the defendant’s actions.55 
Thus, “[o]nce the plaintiffs’ allegations establish at least this 
level of injury, the fact that the plaintiffs anticipate that 
some greater potential harm might follow the defendant’s act 
does not affect the standing inquiry.”56 More recently, in 
Krottner, the Ninth Circuit held that, though the court had 
not previously evaluated the increased risk of future identity 
theft as injury-in-fact, the situation was analogous to other 
contexts where the possibility of future harm was sufficient 
 
51 See, e.g., Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., No. 14-CV-4787, 
2014 WL 7005097, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2014), rev’d and remanded, No. 
14-3700, 2016 WL 1459226 (7th Cir. Apr. 14, 2016) (“In order to have 
suffered an actual injury, Plaintiffs must have had an unreimbursed 
charge on their credit or debit cards.”); In re Michaels Stores Pin Pad 
Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 518, 527 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“Michaels is correct that 
Plaintiffs suffered no actual injury under the ICFA if Plaintiffs were 
reimbursed for all unauthorized withdrawals and bank fees and, thus, 
suffered no out-of-pocket losses.”). 
52 See Cave, supra note 50, at 774. 
53 Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007); see also 
Cave, supra note 50, at 774 & n.62. 
54 Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 629; Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1139; see also Cave, 
supra note 50, at 775. 
55 Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 634. 
56 Id. 
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to meet standing requirements.57 In Krottner, a laptop, 
containing the “unencrypted names, addresses, and social 
security numbers of approximately 97,000 Starbucks 
employees,” was stolen from Starbucks.58 The Ninth Circuit 
considered the increased risk of identity theft enough to 
constitute injury-in-fact. 
Since these cases were decided, however, the Supreme 
Court decided a major case on standing, Clapper v. Amnesty 
International USA.59 Some courts have taken the view that 
Clapper increased the stringency of standing requirements, 
foreclosing standing for plaintiffs alleging increased risk of 
identity theft. Others distinguish Clapper on its unique 
factual situation.60 Regardless of what the “correct” 
interpretation of its holding is, Clapper has undoubtedly 
affected how district courts evaluate plaintiffs’ claims in data 
breach class actions. 
B. Implications of Clapper for Meeting Standing 
Requirements 
In Clapper, plaintiffs attempted to bring a claim 
challenging Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”).61 The plaintiffs were 
lawyers, human rights researchers, and journalists who were 
working with a particular clientele that could be subject to 
surveillance under FISA.62 Section 702 of FISA (“§ 1881a”) 
allows the government to obtain foreign intelligence 
information on a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power 
reasonably believed to be outside of the United States for 
national security purposes.63 The plaintiffs communicated 
regularly with people likely to be targeted under § 1881a, 
 
57 Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1142. 
58 Id. at 1140. 
59 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
60 Clapper and Remijas: A Footnote in the Door for Data Breach 
Plaintiffs, 14 MASS TORTS LITIG. 5, 8 (2015). 
61 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1142. 
62 Id. at 1157. 
63 Id. at 1156. 
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specifically with “people the Government ‘believes or 
believed to be associated with terrorist organizations,’ ‘people 
located in geographic areas that are a special focus’ of the 
Government’s counterterrorism or diplomatic efforts, and 
activists who oppose governments that are supported by the 
United States Government.”64 Due to these concerns about 
§ 1881a, the plaintiffs stopped engaging in certain telephone 
and e-mail conversations and used alternative methods of 
communication, such as traveling abroad to have in-person 
conversations.65 
The plaintiffs asserted two separate theories of Article III 
standing: (1) they would suffer injury because there was “an 
objectively reasonable likelihood that their communications 
[would] be acquired under § 1881a at some point in the 
future,” and (2) they had already suffered injury because 
“the risk of surveillance under § 1881a [was] so substantial 
that they ha[d] been forced to take costly and burdensome 
measures to protect the confidentiality of their international 
communications.”66 Regarding the standing inquiry, this case 
was significant for two reasons. First, it ruled that the 
plaintiffs did not sufficiently demonstrate that the potential 
future injury was imminent.67 Second, it ruled that any costs 
incurred by plaintiffs from their efforts to keep their 
communications confidential did not count towards meeting 
the standing requirement.68 
The Court discussed the “highly attenuated chain of 
possibilities” that would be needed in order for plaintiffs’ 
arguments to prevail:69 
(1) the Government will decide to target the 
communications of non-U.S. persons with whom they 
communicate; (2) in doing so, the Government will 
choose to invoke its authority under § 1881a rather 
than utilizing another method of surveillance; (3) the 
 
64 Id. at 1145. 
65 Id. at 1145–46. 
66 Id. at 1146. 
67 Id. at 1147. 
68 Id. at 1155. 
69 Id. at 1148. 
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Article III judges who serve on the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court will conclude that the 
Government’s proposed surveillance procedures 
satisfy § 1881a’s many safeguards and are consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment; (4) the Government 
will succeed in intercepting the communications of 
respondents’ contacts; and (5) respondents will be 
parties to the particular communications that the 
Government intercepts.70 
Thus, the Court stated the plaintiffs needed to be under 
surveillance authorized by FISA specifically in order to grant 
standing. In the Court’s opinion, reaching that conclusion 
required too long of a chain of inferences based on the 
complaint itself. In addition, the Court stated that even if 
plaintiffs did suffer the future injury from monitoring, they 
could not prove that the monitoring was specifically tied to 
the authorization under FISA.71 They could have been 
monitored under the authority of another statute.72 Thus, 
with this particular set of facts, the Court seemed to impose 
a very rigorous standard for standing. 
C. The Effect of Clapper on Data Breach Cases at the 
District Court Level 
Though Clapper did not technically impose more 
stringent standing requirements or a different doctrine from 
prior cases, it was widely read as an interpretation of 
standing doctrine that made it more difficult for plaintiffs to 
bring suit, especially plaintiffs with claims of future injury.73 
In addition, the subject matter of Clapper, data surveillance 
and future harm, is arguably akin to that of most data 
breach claims. As such, some courts have used Clapper in 
the context of data breach class actions to dismiss cases 
upfront. For instance, the United States District Court for 
 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 1149. 
72 Id. 
73 See Clapper and Remijas: A Footnote in the Door for Data Breach 
Plaintiffs, supra note 60, at 8. 
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the Northern District of Illinois dismissed a data breach 
class action against Barnes & Noble on standing grounds.74 
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group was also initially 
dismissed at the district court level in September 2014.75 The 
district court, in making their decision, relied on a reading of 
Clapper as imposing more stringent standing 
requirements.76 
Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., the most recent 
of these three cases, illustrates this interpretation of Clapper 
well. The United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois ruled that plaintiffs did not meet standing 
requirements and granted the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss.77 In a rather curt opinion, the court dismissed all of 
the plaintiffs’ claims, including (1) assertions of overpayment 
because the services that P.F. Chang’s provided were not up 
to industry standards in terms of data protection; (2) actual 
losses from unauthorized withdrawals and bank fees; 
(3) opportunity cost in monitoring credit, obtaining new 
cards, and losing reward points on cards; and (4) mitigation 
expenses.78 The court did not entertain claims about 
 
74 The case involved a data breach in which individuals “potentially 
stole customer credit and debit information from sixty-three” Barnes & 
Noble stores, located throughout nine states. In re Barnes & Noble Pin 
Pad Litig., No. 12-CV-8617, 2013 WL 4759588, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 
2013). The plaintiffs alleged many injuries, including increased risk of 
identity theft and time and expense related to monitoring and mitigating 
this risk. Id. at *2. District courts in the Ninth Circuit have adopted a 
similar approach of distinguishing Clapper based on its facts. See, e.g., In 
re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1214–15 (N.D. Cal. 
2014); see also Leon Silver, Andy Castricone & Christina Vander Werf, 
Don’t Be a Plaintiff’s Lawyer’s Next Victim: Avoiding the Pitfalls of Data 
Breach Litigation, DRI FOR THE DEFENSE, Feb. 2015, at 38.  
75 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, No. 14-C-1735, 2014 WL 
4627893, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2014), rev’d and remanded, 794 F.3d 688 
(7th Cir. 2015). 
76 Id. 
77 In this particular case, plaintiffs alleged injury stemming from a 
data breach at P.F. Chang’s that compromised, by one estimate, seven 
million cards. Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., No. 14-CV-4787, 
2014 WL 7005097, at *1, *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2014). 
78 See generally id. at *1, *2, *4. 
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increased risk of identity theft in the future. In quoting 
Clapper, the court said that the harm was not “imminent” 
because it could take several years to occur, and that “there 
is no reason to believe that identity theft protection was 
necessary” after the cancellation of the affected debit card.79 
As such, the court did not believe that the plaintiffs 
established injury in fact with respect to mitigation 
damages.80 In addition, the court made it clear that in some 
instances the plaintiffs made arguments without sufficiently 
providing facts or arguments, such as for the opportunity 
cost of losing a chance to accrue reward points.81 Perhaps in 
this case if the plaintiffs’ complaint were more detailed, the 
court would not have dismissed the claims so easily. 
Nevertheless, this case is an illustration of Clapper’s chilling 
effect on the granting of standing in the Seventh Circuit.82 
However, there is some variation in interpreting Clapper 
within the Seventh Circuit. For instance, the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found that 
a plaintiff’s allegations of elevated risk of identity theft were 
sufficient to confer standing in Moyer v. Michaels Stores, 
Inc.83 It differentiated Clapper’s more stringent application 
of the “certainly impending” standard on the factual context 
specific to Clapper: “(1) national security and constitutional 
issues and (2) no evidence that the relevant risk of harm had 
ever materialized in similar circumstances.”84 
Clapper has had virtually no tangible chilling effect on 
data breach cases in the Ninth Circuit. In the Ninth Circuit, 
data breach cases are readily analogized to traditional tort 
claims and standing is generally granted. For instance, in 
 
79 Id. at *3. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at *3. 
82 Note that the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded Lewert v. 
P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc. recently in April 2016 following the 
Remijas standard. Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., No. 14-3700, 
2016 WL 1459226 (7th Cir. Apr. 14, 2016).  
83 Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc., No. 14-C-561, 2014 WL 3511500, at 
*6 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014). 
84 Id. 
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Corona v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc., the District 
Court for the Central District of California granted standing 
for a data breach case regarding the exposure of employee 
information.85 The district court’s reliance on tort law, 
including product liability class actions, illustrates the fact 
that these data breach cases can be boiled down to state tort 
law questions. In this case, for instance, the district court 
looked to five factors adapted from Potter v. Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co., a tort case about exposure to toxic chemicals: 
(1) the significance and extent of the compromise to 
Plaintiffs’ [personally identifiable information]; 
(2) the sensitivity of the compromised information; 
(3) the relative increase in the risk of identity theft 
when compared to (a) Plaintiffs’ chances of identity 
theft had the data breach not occurred, and (b) the 
chances of the public at large being subject to 
identity theft; (4) the seriousness of the consequences 
resulting from identity theft; and (5) the objective 
value of early detection.86 
The court found that the plaintiffs’ claim of injury due to 
the necessity of credit monitoring was reasonable 
considering the fact that the breach caused the public 
disclosure of Sony employees’ sensitive, non-public private 
personally identifiable information including social security 
numbers, salary and bank account information, health 
insurance and other medical information, and visa and 
passport numbers.87 Moreover, there was evidence that the 
hackers shared some of this information online.88 
 
85 Corona v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., No. 14-CV-09600, 2015 WL 
3916744, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2015). Lead plaintiff Michael Corona 
sued Sony on behalf of 15,000 current and former Sony employees when 
the company suffered a data breach. Id. at *1; Kurt Orzeck, Ex-Sony 
Employees Seek Class Cert. In ‘Interview’ Row, LAW360 (July 1, 2015, 4:37 
PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/674778/ex-sony-employees-seek-cla 
ss-cert-in-interview-row [https://perma.cc/TB6V-V5EH]. 
86 Corona, 2015 WL 3916744, at *4 (citing Potter v. Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1008 (Cal. 1993)). 
87 Id. at *4. 
88 See id. at *8. 
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To give an additional example, in In re Adobe Systems, 
Inc. Privacy Litigation, the District Court for the Northern 
District of California found that the Court’s opinion in 
Clapper did not indicate an intention to alter or add to 
existing standing principles, even though some courts 
interpreted Clapper that way.89 The district court 
differentiated the case before it from Clapper based on the 
facts. The Court did not grant standing in Clapper because 
potential future injury was allegedly based on a “highly 
attenuated” chain of possibilities that did not amount to 
“certainly impending” injury.90 In addition, the discussion of 
standing was in the context of other branches of government 
potentially violating the Constitution, which made the 
standing analysis more stringent.91 In In re Adobe Systems, 
it was clear that the hackers deliberately targeted Adobe’s 
consumer information and seemed to have used Adobe’s own 
software to decrypt the information.92 The risk of future 
injury was much more obvious and clearly possible in the 
imminent future from the facts in In re Adobe Systems—the 
facts indicated a targeted breach and some of the stolen data 
had already been released online at the time the case was 
decided.93 
D. Remijas: The Seventh Circuit Case that Granted 
 
89 The Court read Clapper in juxtaposition with Krottner. In re Adobe 
Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 2014); see 
also Silver et al., supra note 74, at 41. The district court granted standing 
to the plaintiffs in this case because of the heightened risk of harm due to 
a 2013 Adobe data breach. In re Adobe Sys., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1214, 1216; 
see also Silver et al., supra note 74, at 41. Defendant Adobe tried to argue 
that Clapper implicitly overruled Krottner, but the court disagreed. In re 
Adobe Sys., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1212. Krottner applied an imminence 
standard using terms similar to those in Clapper. Id. at 1214. The court 
stated that standing was not granted in Clapper due to facts that 
differentiated Clapper from Krottner, and not due to a difference in law. 
See id.  
90 In re Adobe Sys., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1213. 
91 Id. at 1214. 
92 Id. at 1214–15. 
93 Id. at 1215. 
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Standing in the Data Breach Context Post-Clapper 
After Clapper, the first court of appeals to consider a data 
breach case was the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC.94 In Remijas, the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted standing in 
a data breach class action suit.95 Several Neiman Marcus 
customers notified the company of fraudulent charges on 
their credit cards in December 2013.96 After an internal 
inquiry, Neiman Marcus announced that it had been the 
victim of a cyberattack, with approximately 350,000 cards 
exposed to malware between July 16, 2013 and October 30, 
2013.97 In response, several consumers brought a class action 
suit against Neiman Marcus. While the district court ruled 
that individual plaintiffs and the class lacked standing, on 
appeal, the Seventh Circuit ruled in their favor with regards 
to some of their claims.98 
The plaintiffs asserted two imminent injuries: “an 
increased risk of future fraudulent charges and greater 
susceptibility to identity theft.”99 The plaintiffs alleged four 
injuries already suffered: 
1) lost time and money resolving the fraudulent 
charges, 2) lost time and money protecting 
themselves against future identity theft, 3) the 
financial loss of buying items at Neiman Marcus that 
they would not have purchased had they known of 
the store’s careless approach to cybersecurity, and 
4) lost control over the value of their personal 
information.100 
Under Clapper, claims for future harm can satisfy Article 
III standing requirements “if the harm is ‘certainly 
impending,’ but ‘allegations of possible future injury are not 
 
94 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015). 
95 Remijas, 794 F.3d at 697. 
96 Id. at 689–90. 
97 Id. at 690. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 692. 
100 Id. 
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sufficient.’”101 Although the district court read Clapper as 
foreclosing use of future injuries to establish Article III 
standing in data breach situations, the Seventh Circuit read 
Clapper differently.102 Unlike the facts of Clapper, the 
potential injury—that the plaintiffs’ data would be 
misused—was imminent and real.103 The court stated that 
the threat of potential injury was reasonably likely to occur 
because making fraudulent charges or assuming the 
plaintiffs’ identities was the very reason why hackers stole 
credit card information from Neiman Marcus in the first 
place.104 Thus, at the pleading stage, this court granted 
standing based on future injury: “an increased risk of future 
fraudulent charges and greater susceptibility to identity 
theft.”105 
In terms of harms already suffered, though the court was 
not convinced by claims (3) and (4), it decided that claims (1) 
and (2) were sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact 
requirement of Article III standing.106 The court also held 
that the other two requirements of Article III standing 
(causation and redressability) were satisfied.107 Regarding 
causation, although one could argue that the hackers 
obtained the credit card information through other avenues 
(and potentially not through the malware in Neiman 
Marcus’s system), there was a sufficient enough possibility 
that Neiman Marcus’s malware exposed the information in 
question for the case to continue.108 Regarding redressability, 
although it was true that any fraudulent charges to the 
plaintiffs’ accounts were already reimbursed (via the current 
credit systems and insurance systems whereby financial 
institutions and insurers assume liability), redressability 
 
101 Id. (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 
(2013)). 
102 Id. at 693. 
103 Id. at 694. 
104 Id. at 693. 
105 Id. at 692. 
106 Id. at 696. 
107 Id. at 696–97. 
108 Id. at 696. 
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was still applicable for “the mitigation expenses or the future 
injuries.”109 Moreover, there was no guarantee that the 
injuries plaintiffs suffered or would suffer would be fully 
reimbursed, due to a variety of restrictions on credit card 
and debit card liability rules regarding prompt reporting and 
other variables.110 Therefore, the court reasoned a favorable 
court decision would benefit the plaintiffs.111 
This Seventh Circuit decision echoes some of the existing 
data breach case law doctrine within the Seventh Circuit and 
the Ninth Circuit before Clapper. It reveals the Seventh 
Circuit’s reasoning and shows that Clapper—at least in the 
Seventh Circuit’s view—does not restrict standing in data 
breach cases. One possible explanation for the Seventh 
Circuit’s reasoning in Remijas is the contextual difference 
between data breaches and foreign intelligence gathering; 
Clapper was a decision based on unique facts. In Remijas, 
the Seventh Circuit took care to distinguish the situation 
before them from Clapper and pointed out the mistake the 
district court made in its interpretation of Clapper.112 In 
Clapper, the plaintiffs merely suspected that the government 
intercepted their communications with potential terrorists.113 
The Supreme Court dismissed the case because its claims 
were too speculative; yet, in so doing, they were still 
following the “substantial risk” standard.114 The standard 
was still in place, though the plaintiffs in Clapper were 
unable to meet it.115 
In data breach cases generally, the data has already been 
stolen or compromised because the breach has already 
occurred. Therefore, the harm is not nearly as speculative as 
the possibility of surveillance in Clapper. The Seventh 
Circuit argued that the plaintiffs should not have to wait 
until actual injury or identity theft occurs, since, as the 
 
109 Id. at 697. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 693. 
113 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1149–50 (2013). 
114 Id. at 1150, n.5. 
115 Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693. 
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Seventh Circuit stated, “Why else would hackers break into 
a store’s database and steal consumers’ private information? 
Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to 
make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers’ 
identities.”116 To force plaintiffs to wait until actual 
identifiable injury occurs would give an undue advantage to 
potential defendants to argue that the identity theft is not 
“fairly traceable” to the defendants’ data breach.117 
E. The Third Circuit: A Different Point of View 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have 
clear positions on plaintiffs’ standing in data breach 
scenarios with respect to increased risk of future harm: 
increased risk of identity theft is a sufficient injury to meet 
Article III standing requirements.118 In contrast, the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit considers future increased risk 
of identity theft as insufficient injury to meet the 
requirements of Article III standing.119 The Third Circuit 
fundamentally differs in its approach because of the 
“speculative nature of any increased risk of future harm” in 
most data breach cases.120 
 
116 Id. 
117 Id. (quoting In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 
1197, 1215 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2014)). 
118 Cave, supra note 50, at 774. 
119 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has also heard a case on 
data breach. However, the facts of that case differed from the typical data 
breach suit because the suit was brought preemptively—that is, before any 
breach occurred. The First Circuit denied standing. See Katz v. Pershing, 
LLC, 672 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2012). The plaintiff claimed a risk of future 
harm due to a perceived weakness in data security. Id. at 80. Although the 
First Circuit has not yet decided a case directly analogous to the other 
cases discussed in this Note, the First Circuit seems more likely to rule in 
opposition to the Seventh Circuit because the Court held that the lack of a 
data breach was a fatal omission. Id.; see also Miles L. Galbraith, 
Comment, Identity Crisis: Seeking a Unified Approach to Plaintiff 
Standing for Data Security Breaches of Sensitive Personal Information, 62 
AM. U. L. REV. 1365, 1385 (2013).  
120 Cave, supra note 50, at 776. 
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In December 2011, in Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., the Third 
Circuit denied standing in a data breach case because the 
plaintiffs did not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.121 
The court found that “allegations of an increased risk of 
identity theft as a result of the security breach [were] 
hypothetical, future injuries, and [were] therefore 
insufficient to establish standing.”122 In so holding, the court 
distinguished data breach cases from other factual scenarios 
that would more readily show the risk of future injury (and 
as such, be able to proceed on the merits) such as defective 
medical device, toxic exposure, and environmental claims.123  
The plaintiffs argued before the court that data breach 
cases should be treated similarly to traditional torts cases for 
three reasons: (1) they “expended monies on credit 
monitoring and insurance to protect their safety, just as 
plaintiffs in defective-medical-device and toxic-substance-
exposure cases expend monies on medical monitoring”; 
(2) “members of this putative class may very well have 
suffered emotional distress from the incident, which also 
represents a bodily injury, just as plaintiffs in the medical-
device and toxic-tort cases have suffered physical injuries”; 
and (3) “injury to one’s identity is extraordinarily unique and 
money may not even compensate one for the injuries 
sustained, just as environmental injury is unique and 
monetary compensation may not adequately return plaintiffs 
to their original position.”124 However, the court was not 
convinced by these arguments because traditional tort cases 
have two important elements that were missing in this data 
breach case: an injury that has undoubtedly occurred and 
the fact that the cases hinge on human health concerns.125 
Though the weight the court attached to human health 
concerns is difficult to criticize, there are several weak points 
in the court’s opinion that should have been addressed. First, 
the idea that an injury has not yet occurred in a data breach 
 
121 Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 46 (3d Cir. 2011). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 44–46. 
124 Id. at 44. 
125 Id. at 45. 
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context is debatable. The court justified its position by 
comparing the data breach situation to an exposure to a toxic 
substance.126 In a toxic exposure case, the “exposure to a 
toxic substance causes injury; cells are damaged and a 
disease mechanism has been introduced” and as such, the 
harm has already been done though the consequences may 
not yet be apparent.127 Despite arguably analogous 
circumstances in data breach cases, the court was not willing 
to grant standing in the data breach context. The court 
seemed to think that medical consequences from toxic 
exposure were more predictable, while the negative 
consequences from data breach were not nearly as certain.128 
The court’s analysis of toxic exposure cases shows that 
standing was granted in these cases though the medical 
consequences of the toxic exposure were not evident at the 
time the motion was filed. Similar arguments can also be 
made in the data breach context: the harm of data breach is 
analogous to toxic exposure, and the consequences of both 
are somewhat predictable but perhaps not specifically 
quantifiable. The court seemed to think that predictability of 
results is quite high in toxic exposure cases, but perhaps the 
court put too much weight on the reliability of medical 
predictions. In other words, to the extent there may be 
unpredictability in the medical field, there is a similar level 
of unpredictability in data breaches and the potential fraud 
that follows. If the court allows standing despite not knowing 
exactly what medical consequences will flow from toxic 
exposure, the court should allow standing despite not 
knowing exactly what identity theft or fraud consequences 
will flow from a data breach. 
 
126 Id. 
127 Id. (stating “we just cannot yet quantify how it [the harm] will 
manifest itself” in terms of the development of symptoms or disease). 
Thus, note that the court conceded that the potential consequences of the 
initial exposure to toxic substances were not quantifiable. Yet, the court 
seemed to put greater weight on the predictability of health consequences 
than harmful consequences from data breaches despite the potential 
uncertainty in both contexts. 
128 See id. 
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The court decided not to grant standing in Reilly because 
the court mischaracterized the harm that is done when data 
is breached. The court failed to recognize that there was a 
harm in the breach itself analogous to the first exposure to 
toxic substances. The court reasoned that the status of data 
is the same, whether or not it has been exposed: 
In data breach cases where no misuse is alleged, 
however, there has been no injury—indeed, no 
change in the status quo. Here, Appellants’ credit 
card statements are exactly the same today as they 
would have been had Ceridian’s database never been 
hacked. Moreover, there is no quantifiable risk of 
damage in the future.129 
In doing so, the Reilly court articulated an argument 
based on a possible misunderstanding about the value of 
private data. Since no bad act was done yet based on the 
exposed information, the court presumed that the data was 
no more vulnerable post-data breach than it was pre-data 
breach. Yet, post-data breach, regardless of any evidence of 
misuse of the exposed data, the exposed information is 
arguably in a different position from information only 
previously accessible by authorized parties. In other words, 
the act of exposure can be said to fundamentally change the 
nature of the information, as privacy has been breached. In 
short, the Third Circuit did not entertain the possibility that 
information that is exposed is more vulnerable and somehow 
altered from the same information properly kept 
confidential. 
Second, the court viewed redressability entirely in 
monetary terms. It believed that any harm to privacy could 
be resolved monetarily, which distinguished data breach 
cases from cases involving human health. However, this 
distinction may not be legitimate, since in cases involving 
human health, money is given as a form of redress too. As 
the court stated when distinguishing data breach cases from 
environmental claims, “[T]he thing feared lost here is simple 
cash, which is easily and precisely compensable with a 
 
129 Id. 
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monetary award.”130 Thus, the court’s unwillingness to 
recognize privacy rights was evident, which flows from its 
mischaracterization of data privacy. One can argue that 
exposed private information is more likely to be misused 
than protected private information, which alters and affects 
the privacy of the information. This type of harm was not 
captured by the court’s analysis. 
Though the Third Circuit did not grant standing in Reilly, 
separate charges filed later by the FTC demonstrated that 
the defendant company, Ceridian, really did fail to secure its 
customers’ personal and financial data and had wrought 
serious harm.131 This suggests that perhaps the court should 
have granted standing in the case to address the potential 
harm and allow the plaintiffs the opportunity to recover 
damages. Though an investigation by an administrative 
agency is not equivalent to a judicial proceeding, it is 
indicative of a problem potentially worth litigating. As such, 
this gives additional weight to the argument that standing 
should have been granted in this case. 
IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH SHOULD 
BE FOLLOWED, DESPITE PRACTICAL 
COMPLICATIONS 
A. The Seventh Circuit’s Approach Is a Step in the 
Right Direction 
The standard of the Seventh Circuit, among current 
circuit decisions, is the best for plaintiffs and the best for 
society. It gives plaintiffs the opportunity to address the real 
harm, injuries, and vulnerabilities experienced by 
individuals in data breach situations. Data breaches happen 
too frequently, and affect most, if not all, Americans in some 
way. Though the courts might not be the ultimate solution to 
the data breach problem, an approach that utilizes a more 
 
130 Id. at 45–46. 
131 The company faced an investigation and fines from the FTC. See 
Galbraith, supra note 119, at 1383–84 & n.135. 
KIM – FINAL  
574 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2016 
relaxed standing requirement in the data breach context is 
an effective method to address the data breach problem 
within the current legal context. 
The Seventh Circuit’s approach bridges the disconnect 
between the injury-in-fact standing requirement and 
allegations of potential future injury by plaintiffs. The 
Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Remijas now allows plaintiffs to 
more easily bring data breach claims.132 The Seventh 
Circuit’s decision may be the beginning of a shift to thinking 
about data breach cases as certainly having standing, and 
victims as suffering the injury of increased risk of future 
harm. The decision is encouraging, and hopefully will stem 
the tide of district courts using Clapper to deny standing in 
data breach class actions. 
Some commentators have argued in favor of the Third 
Circuit’s approach, since it does not foreclose the possibility 
of bringing a data breach case based on an increased risk in 
identity theft.133 That court signaled in dicta that it might be 
willing to grant standing if it was clear that the party who 
committed data breach took personal information, intended 
to commit future criminal action using this information, and 
was able to use this information by making unauthorized 
transactions in the names of data breach victims.134 Though 
some commentators say this is consistent with existing 
standing doctrine, others have argued that these so-called 
Reilly requirements impose too high a bar for plaintiffs.135 
The Third Circuit’s test is quite stringent in that it does not 
leave room for the privacy harm from the exposure of data to 
be recognized in any form. Ultimately, a discussion of what 
is private and what is not is essential to tackling the data 
 
132 For instance, following Remijas, the Seventh Circuit reversed and 
remanded a district court decision that had previously denied data breach 
plaintiffs standing. Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., No. 14-3700, 
2016 WL 1459226 (7th Cir. Apr. 14, 2016). 
133 Elizabeth T. Isaacs, Comment, Exposure Without Redress: A 
Proposed Remedial Tool for the Victims Who Were Set Aside, 67 OKLA. L. 
REV. 519, 533 (2015). 
134 Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42; see also Isaacs, supra note 133, at 533–34. 
135 Isaacs, supra note 133, at 534 & n.124. 
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breach problem head on, as questions of privacy and 
potential privacy harm underlie all data breach situations. 
Though the Seventh Circuit’s approach does not directly 
address privacy harm either, its broader reading of standing 
requirements leaves room for that discussion to take place. 
As more class actions are granted standing, more of them 
have a chance at succeeding on their merits, and companies 
will be exposed to a greater risk of being liable. Currently, 
stringent interpretation of standing requirements is a major 
obstacle to getting consumer victims into court across the 
board, not just in the realm of data breach cases.136 
Nevertheless, class actions remain a potentially powerful 
tool for consumers to keep big corporations responsible, 
since, as Judge Posner has said, “only a lunatic or a fanatic 
sues for $30.”137 Class actions have traditionally allowed 
individual victims to band together to challenge improper 
actions by powerful companies.138 Utilizing class actions is 
also a potentially useful vehicle for moving towards 
regulatory reform, which will eventually be better for 
companies too. There are historical examples of such shifts, 
where traditional tort suits led to the creation of an 
 
136 See Simon Lazarus, The Stealth Corporate Takeover of the 
Supreme Court, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 18, 2015). https://newrepublic.com/ 
article/123984/the-stealth-corporate-takeover-of-the-supreme-court 
[https://perma.cc/5BER-SEHD]. The article discusses a case in which a 
credit agency misrepresented the victim’s credit history but the plaintiff 
was not granted standing. Id. The court stated that Congress could 
provide redress only if plaintiff could show something tangible such as a 
rejection for a job or a loan, and show that furthermore the rejection was 
due to the credit rating agency’s mistaken representation of the plaintiff’s 
credit history. Id. In addition, the article discusses a case where workers 
asking for overtime pay were not able to use basic statistical sampling 
techniques to show that plaintiffs had suffered injury because they were 
not paid overtime pay for time spent “donning and doffing” required 
protective clothing and equipment. Id. These are examples of class actions 
that have been stopped at the courthouse door due to increasingly 
restrictive interpretations of Article III standing requirements. 
137 Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 
2004). 
138 See Lazarus, supra note 136. 
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extensive regulatory framework.139 For instance, in the food 
industry context, initial tort litigation was barred by the lack 
of direct contractual liability between the consumer and the 
companies that produced food.140 Yet by the mid-1900s, this 
barrier was taken away so more tort suits were filed.141 
Facing growing numbers of these challenges from 
consumers, some companies instituted greater safety 
regulations on their own.142 In addition, the modern 
administrative regulatory state was born to set standards for 
food safety.143 Though a direct causal link cannot be found, 
the increase in suits against food and drug companies and 
the rise of regulatory bodies for this sector could be related to 
each other in that the increasing number of suits probably 
alerted the government to the need for regulation. Thus, 
class actions can lead to the development of a larger 
regulatory state that develops, promulgates, and enforces 
regulations and addresses individual subject matter concerns 
as they arise. Successful data breach class action suits, and 
subsequent pushback by companies who have to bear that 
burden without adequate guidelines, will hopefully generate 
enough momentum for the federal government to move 
towards a more comprehensive regulatory solution through 
which consumers and companies will have clear legal 
standards. 
Though resolving the circuit split by adopting the 
Seventh Circuit’s approach makes the most sense in terms of 
 
139 See generally, e.g., Philip Chen, O’Neill Inst. for Glob. & Nat’l 
Health Law at Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Appendix B: A Review of Tort 
Liability’s Role in Food and Medical Product Regulation, in INST. OF MED. 
OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ENSURING SAFE FOODS AND MEDICAL PRODUCTS 
THROUGH STRONGER REGULATORY SYSTEMS ABROAD 253–64, (Jim E. Riviere 
& Gillian J. Buckley eds., 2012), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK 
201154/ [https://perma.cc/98UL-78GL] (summarizing the development of 
food regulation and medical product regulation through pressure from tort 
suits which allowed suits regardless of a direct contractual relationship 
between a producer and the consumer-victim). 
140 Id. at 255. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 254. 
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beginning to remedy the data breach problem, there are 
significant practical complications with this approach. These 
issues are discussed in sections B–E of this Part. 
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit’s approach is the most 
appropriate because it recognizes consumer harm and shifts 
the potential responsibility onto companies by allowing 
consumer class actions to litigate substantive issues before a 
court, rather than stopping them at the door. The company is 
the appropriate bearer of responsibility in any data breach 
situation since they are in the best position to address 
breaches that do occur and prevent future ones from 
occurring. At the end of the day, this is where the 
responsibility should lie; it should not be up to the individual 
consumer victim to resolve the issue when a data breach 
occurs at a company. The complications that result from 
adopting the Seventh Circuit’s line of reasoning is not an 
indictment of the approach of the court itself. Rather, they 
reflect the confused and complicated nature of the state of 
the law in this field and the need for an ultimate regulatory 
remedy. 
B. Finding Companies Negligent Without a Clear 
Understanding of What Negligence Means in This 
Context is Problematic 
If data breach cases are increasingly litigated in the 
courtroom, the outcome and analysis will center on the role 
and liability of the private company that experienced the 
breach. A finding that a company is negligent without a clear 
legal or industry standard is problematic for a variety of 
reasons. First, companies are currently operating without 
clear guidance from a set of regulations or best practices.144 
 
144 Certainly, potential data safety security standards exist, as 
discussed briefly in Part II of this Note (such as state and federal 
regulations, suggested guidelines from agencies, and international sources 
such as the European Union guidelines or ISO/IEC 27001:2013). See, e.g., 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO/EIC 27001:2013 
(2013), https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:54534:en [https://perma.cc/48Z8-
2JEL]. The problem lies in the fact that a comprehensive set of 
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At the end of the day, data breach class actions boil down to 
a torts negligence action and negligence generally implies a 
certain standard of care. In the data breach context, 
however, this is problematic because the acceptable standard 
is not clear. No one knows what the real standards are 
beyond a certain baseline level of care (i.e., companies doing 
a bad job are fairly obvious to spot, but what a good job or an 
adequate job would look like is not apparent). As such, 
though courts putting the onus of responsibility on 
companies makes sense in most instances of data breach, 
doing so without a clear understanding of what the 
appropriate duty of care is yet another issue that must be 
resolved. This is an area ripe for the intervention of 
standardized regulations. 
Currently, given the lack of definitive best practices, 
directors are probably in the best position to gauge what 
would be appropriate for their company and their 
situation.145 As mentioned above, certain baseline data 
security standards in the industry are currently discernible 
despite the lack of standardized regulation, and company 
management should be proactive in maintaining their own 
data security systems and paying attention to developments 
in the field to keep apprised of best data security practices. 
Because of the current lack of standardization, directors 
have to fashion these practices for themselves. Moreover, 
directors should be incentivized to do so not only because of 
potential damages from class consumer data breach cases, 
but because of the potential for derivative director and officer 
suits arising out of data breach incidents.146 Courts are 
beginning to interpret the duties of directors to include the 
investment and management of an effective data security 
 
standardized data security guidelines is not currently enforced on a 
federal level. 
145 Davis et al., supra note 29, at 621. 
146 Kevin M. LaCroix, When Data Hacks Lead to D&O Lawsuits, 
Actual and Threatened, THE D&O DIARY (Aug. 31, 2015) http://www. 
dandodiary.com/2015/08/articles/cyber-liability/when-data-hacks-lead-to-
do-lawsuits-actual-and-threatened/ [https://perma.cc/J5L6-4HK4].  
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structure.147 One such case involved a data breach at 
Wyndham Hotels and it named ten directors and officers.148 
The case was eventually dismissed, but the court’s analysis 
included a finding that the directors were not grossly 
negligent in conducting the investigation after the data 
breach. The court found that: Wyndham’s board discussed 
the cyberattacks during fourteen meetings within the 
relevant time frame, along with a presentation by the 
general counsel on the subject at each meeting; the board’s 
audit committee discussed data breach and data security 
during at least sixteen meetings within the relevant time 
period; and the company had hired third-party firms to 
investigate the breach and recommend improvements to 
Wyndham’s systems.149 As such, some courts seem to require 
evidence of directors noticing, investigating, and 
appropriately responding to cyberattacks and data risks. 
This expectation most likely naturally extends into general 
data security system management before any breach occurs 
as well. Though these types of suits are not yet 
commonplace, the attempts to bring such suits indicate a 
need for a gap of enforcement to be filled. Thus, some 
principles of the duty of care with regards to data security 
should be built into the existing corporate regulatory 
framework. 
It is important to note that despite this ambiguity, some 
data security standards are clearly possible. The European 
Union already has regulations in place,150 and the American 
 
147 See Michelle A. Reed, Natasha G. Kohne & Jenny M. Walters, 
Fiduciary Duties of Directors Are Key to Minimizing Cyber Risk, 
NACDONLINE.ORG (May/June 2015), at 41, https://www.akingump.com/ 
images/content/3/6/v2/36491/NACD-article.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EDF-
MYG6].  
148 Palkon v. Holmes, No. 2:14-CV-01234, 2014 WL 5341880, at *1 
(D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2014); see also Reed et al., supra note 147, at 42. 
149 Palkon, 2014 WL 5341880, at *5; see also Reed et al., supra note 
147, at 42. 
150 See generally EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, 
HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW (2014), https://fra. 
europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-handbook-data-protection-law-2nd-
ed_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/7K3J-FZRT]. 
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federal government should follow suit. As discussed above, 
some regulatory agencies, such as the FTC, are already 
taking on some of that regulatory work.151 Comprehensive 
regulatory guidelines are necessary to give companies 
adequate guidance on best practices for data security, and 
the FTC may be able to play this role.152 In Pisciotta and 
Krottner, for example, the court found that the companies 
involved may have been negligent in some way, such as by 
not using a service that was secure enough for banking 
applications or not encrypting employee data.153 In Remijas, 
there were alerts to Neiman Marcus’s security system that 
were triggered when it was compromised.154 The hackers set 
off alerts about 60,000 times as they made their way through 
the network, sometimes setting off hundreds of alerts daily 
since the card-stealing software was deleted automatically 
each day from the payment registers.155 Neiman Marcus 
claimed that the hackers were sophisticated in giving their 
malware a name nearly identical to the company’s payment 
software, and indicated that the 60,000 entries over the 
course of several months represented on average around one 
percent or less of the daily entries in their protection 
system.156 Overlooking these warning signs may be 
understandable in these circumstances, but this shows that 
potential data breaches can be flagged. Missing alerts 
because the malware appeared to be named something very 
similar to the existing system demonstrates the flaws of data 
security system design, but it also shows the potential for 
improvement. In addition, the facts indicate that the internal 
 
151 Cave, supra note 50, at 790. 
152 Isaacs, supra note 133, at 557. 
153 Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 299 F.3d 629, 631–32 (7th Cir. 
2007); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
154 Ben Elgin, Dune Lawrence & Michael Riley, Neiman Marcus 
Hackers Set Off 60,000 Alerts While Bagging Credit Card Data, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-
02-21/neiman-marcus-hackers-set-off-60-000-alerts-while-bagging-credit-
card-data [https://perma.cc/3JMS-Z4YL].  
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
KIM – FINAL  
No. 2:544] STANDING IN DATA BREACH CASES 581 
system worked and alerted the right people (though no 
action was taken), which means that changes could 
potentially be implemented so that action is taken earlier on 
next time.157 Holding companies accountable to some 
standard of care is possible, and regulators and courts should 
aspire to create incentives for companies to do that. 
Following the Seventh Circuit’s approach and allowing 
standing in more class actions which hold companies 
accountable will encourage more responsible behavior on the 
part of companies. Courts are capable of evaluating what 
data security measures are reasonable and requiring 
minimum standards at the very least until more 
comprehensive regulatory measures are put in place. 
C. Holding Companies Responsible May Be 
Problematic When, in Some Cases, Hackings Are 
Serious Criminal Acts That the Company Could Not 
Have Reasonably Prevented  
Even if companies take action and implement more 
protections in the future, there is no guarantee that they will 
be able to combat the sophisticated criminal activity of bad 
actors. The standard of care should be flexible as the 
technology evolves. Though private companies should be held 
accountable to a baseline level of care, addressing 
cyberattacks and hacking is always going to be a challenge, 
and the government and private companies will have to work 
together to come up with a solution. The government is not 
currently capable of prosecuting criminal hackers abroad 
effectively in some situations.158 Data breach is clearly a 
complicated problem that goes beyond just our borders; 
individual companies should not have to shoulder that 
burden alone. 
In some cases, sophisticated criminal hackers specifically 
target companies, and this fact must be recognized. It is 
unclear whether it makes sense to hold companies liable 
 
157 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 
2015). 
158 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 44. 
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when they could not have reasonably prevented particularly 
sophisticated or malicious attacks. For instance, the 2014 
JPMorgan breach was originally thought to be a benign, run-
of-the-mill data breach hack because it was not particularly 
sophisticated.159 However, federal prosecutors recently 
uncovered “a trail of [seventy-five] shell companies and a 
hacking scheme in which the three defendants used [thirty] 
false passports from [seventeen] different countries.”160 The 
data breach was a critical component of a wide-ranging 
criminal enterprise that funneled money from Israel to the 
United States, through Cyprus, Azerbaijan and 
Switzerland.161 This data breach, though not particularly 
sophisticated on its face, was actually part of a concerted, 
longstanding criminal plan.162 As this example shows, data 
breach cases can often involve more actors and be much 
more serious than they appear at first glance. Putting the 
responsibility wholly on the victim company in these 
instances is most likely unjust and will not help fix the 
problem. 
In addition, some companies that have experienced data 
breaches recognize the serious nature of the hacking and 
fight back by suing the hackers. On February 27, 2015, Uber 
announced that it experienced a data breach and sued an 
unknown person (“John Doe I”) alleging violations of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and California’s 
 
159 Matthew Goldstein, 4 Arrested in Schemes Said to Be Tied to 




160 Liz Moyer, Prosecutors Announce More Charges in Hacking of 




161 Greg Farrell, JPMorgan’s 2014 Hack Tied to Largest Cyber Breach 
Ever, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Nov. 10, 2015, 9:31 AM), http://www.bloom 
berg.com/news/articles/2015-11-10/hackers-accused-by-u-s-of-targeting-
top-banks-mutual-funds [https://perma.cc/KMD4-T3G5]. 
162 See id. 
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Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act in the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.163 
“John Doe I” is the stand-in name for the unknown 
individual or individuals who hacked into Uber’s database 
and downloaded files. So far, the court granted Uber’s 
motions for discovery on a third-party website it believed the 
hacker used and the Internet service provider of the page in 
order to attempt to identify the hacker.164 This also opens the 
door to questions about whose role it is to track down the 
hacker—the company has an incentive to do so, but if a 
cybercrime is committed against the company, the 
government may have an obligation to do so as well. Private 
parties should not necessarily have to expend resources to 
help prosecute this type of crime. 
As both targets and victims of data breach, companies are 
at the center of these crimes. As such, companies are in the 
best possible position to respond to the data breach problem. 
Sometimes, companies do everything right by having good 
data security practices in place and following all the 
necessary remedial steps available after a breach has 
occurred. Though this is true in some cases, it is not a 
relevant concern in the context of granting standing to 
consumer class action cases on data breach. Consumers 
should be allowed to get in through the door to litigate the 
merits of their case because of the harm that they suffered. 
This harm must be recognized, regardless of whether or not 
the company might be at fault. The standing requirement in 
a typical class action case should not bar these facts from 
coming to light. The company will genuinely not be at fault 
in some situations, but class actions will allow consumers to 
seek recourse when that is not the case—when companies 
are too lax with their data security and have weaknesses in 
their systems that should have been addressed. Increased 
litigation will only incentivize companies to be more careful 
in designing effective data security systems, which is an 
 
163 Magistrate Dismisses Former Uber Driver’s Class Action Over Data 
Breach, MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: CLASS ACTIONS, Nov. 3, 2015, at 23. 
164 Id. 
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optimal result for consumers entrusting their data to private 
companies. 
D. Holding Companies Liable May Actually Shift the 
Costs to Other Institutional Players 
The Seventh Circuit’s approach may result in more 
verdicts against companies, but the companies themselves 
may not be paying the actual costs, meaning the proper 
parties may not be held accountable. Other entities that 
private companies work with—such as insurance companies, 
credit card companies, and banks—might incur the most 
costs from data breach losses. In fact, holding the company 
liable does not necessarily incentivize companies to better 
protect data in those cases, since currently credit card 
companies and financial institutions are often covering the 
damages associated with compensating data breach 
consumer victims in the moments immediately after a 
breach. These companies often monitor accounts, re-issue 
new cards, and reimburse for fraudulent charges.165 
Nevertheless, this discrepancy in responsibility shows that 
there are serious costs associated with data breach, which 
bolsters the argument for granting standing in data breach 
cases. Data breach involves clear harms and damages that 
someone has to pay. Allowing more data breach litigation 
will allow for the companies experiencing the breach to be 
held liable as a legal matter. As more companies are held 
liable, the fact that banks, insurance companies, and credit-
card companies have to pay out and are affected by data 
breaches generally will come to light. This will hopefully 
channel pressure towards a change to the status quo so that 
companies will be properly incentivized to protect their data. 
The complexity of modern credit network relationships 
means that litigation is an incomplete solution for remedying 
losses from data breach. This also means that when a 
merchant company experiences a data breach, the merchant 
company’s costs may be lower than the costs that card-
issuing institutions (e.g., banks) have to pay to remedy the 
 
165 Patty, supra note 11, at 5–6.  
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breach and the fraud that follows. Moreover, banks need to 
cover for breaches experienced by merchant companies in 
addition to the breaches that they themselves are facing, 
since financial institutions are targets of hackers as well. To 
give just one example, JPMorgan announced in October 2014 
that its system was breached, with more than 76 million 
household customer records and seven million business 
records affected.166 In addition, banks face additional 
responsibilities from being in a heavily regulated industry. 
As such, they face burdens that private merchant companies 
do not have to shoulder. Furthermore, since clear standards 
for data protection schemes for merchant companies are not 
enforced, companies with fairly lax policies can slide by 
without investing in good data protection. 
Currently, the only tangible, significant incentives for 
companies to prevent data breach are relatively “soft” 
factors, such as consumer trust, consumer loyalty, and public 
perception concerns. From this point of view, banks might be 
footing the bill for companies’ negligence in most data 
breaches. As one commentator stated, 
Financial institutions in the payment card process 
data chain of custody are subject to various state and 
federal statutes and regulations concerning data 
privacy and security, while merchants and other 
private sector participants elsewhere in the data 
chain of custody are subject, at least for now, to 
relatively few data security laws or regulations.167 
This seems particularly unfair considering that the 
financial institutions that cover these costs might not even 
have direct contractual relationships with the company that 
experienced the data breach.168 In addition, there are few 
remedies available to these financial institutions via 
insurance: 
[W]hen the target of the initial data breach is 
relatively unregulated, and there is a lack of privity 
 
166 Id. at 5. 
167 Id. at 5. 
168 See id. at 6. 
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of contract between that party and the card-issuing 
financial institution ultimately burdened by 
remediation costs and fund losses due to fraud, 
recovery of damages beyond the limits of any 
applicable insurance coverage for the card issuer can 
prove to be a challenge.169 
Furthermore, large banks, such as JPMorgan, are not the 
only ones harmed in the context of data breach. Smaller 
institutions are starting to bring claims against merchant 
companies that have experienced data breaches as a result of 
the hardship these smaller banking institutions experience 
in reimbursing fraudulent transactions or having to provide 
new credit or debit cards to affected customers.170 The Credit 
Union National Association has been active in bringing 
attention to this problem and advocating for changes in the 
law that would transfer the burden from financial 
institutions to the merchant companies.171 
Recognizing these agency problems and imbalances in 
responsibility, some states have enacted or are considering 
statutes that prohibit the retention of payment card data for 
more than forty-eight hours after transaction authorization, 
and allow financial institutions to apply for and receive 
reimbursement from merchant companies utilizing credit 
card networks that are in violation of the state statutory 
mandates and who then experience a data breach.172 This 
accomplishes the twin goals of regulating merchant 
companies and holding them responsible for trying to 
prevent data breach and also relieving financial institutions 
of their duty to provide remedies to data breach victims by 
reimbursing victims for fraudulent charges and reissuing 
cards. 
The current imbalance of responsibility is an indication of 
the problems existing in the current state of affairs, but 
these state laws balance out the burdens and are an example 
 
169 Id. at 6. 
170 Thomas Richie, Data Breach Class Actions, A.B.A. THE BRIEF, 
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of a possible solution. Companies can be properly 
incentivized to protect consumer data, for if they fail, they 
will be penalized with reimbursing other institutional actors. 
These laws at the state level were a response to the card-
issuing banks that had pushed back at having to pay the 
price for what they perceive as the merchant company’s 
negligence for allowing the data breach to occur in the first 
place. Allowing more data breach class actions using the 
Seventh Circuit’s recognition of increased risk of future harm 
will name more companies as responsible, which is 
significant in its own right. In addition, this will bring more 
attention to the complexity of the data breach problem, 
recognize the parties that are truly bearing the burden of 
data breach, and ultimately will push the system towards a 
streamlined regulatory solution. 
E. Holding Companies Liable Through the Court 
System Does Not Adequately Address Fundamental 
Considerations About Privacy 
Though the Seventh Circuit’s approach is a step in the 
right direction, merely conferring standing for increased risk 
of future harm does not adequately recognize privacy harms 
to the individual. Though there is plenty of case law for 
addressing physical injuries such as assault and economic 
harms such as breach of contract, there is no traditional 
basis for the new losses we experience as a society in the 
digital age.173 Standing requirements have become a point of 
concern for such new, evolving legal protections. Individual 
data breach victims have tried to address these issues 
through litigation, but they have often been turned away at 
the courthouse door. Thus far, no case has decided that data 
breach, in and of itself, constitutes an injury and confers 
standing. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit’s approach at 
least recognizes the harm of increased risk of future injury, 
 
173 See Lexi Rubow, Note, Standing in the Way of Privacy Protections: 
The Argument for a Relaxed Article III Standing Requirement for 
Constitutional and Statutory Causes of Action, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1007, 1010–12 (2014). 
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which is a step in the right direction for litigating all of the 
issues related to data breach. 
Data breach cases are fundamentally linked to ideas of 
data privacy. Though overlapping, the two concepts are 
actually quite different. Unauthorized and broad 
surveillance of our online activities and communications by 
government entities and private companies should definitely 
be of concern. Perhaps the possibility of identity theft, 
however, is a fact of modern life. The reality is that most 
data breach cases, even the ones that have been granted 
standing, do not operate under the assumption that the 
stolen data or the exposed data itself is a harm worth 
bringing suit over. The potential for misuse is seen as the 
actionable harm, but not necessarily the breach itself. 
On the one hand, the courts’ somewhat lax approach to 
privacy makes sense—how much of a privacy violation can 
you claim in good faith in today’s hyper-connected world? 
Does it really matter if a hacker somewhere knows a 
consumer’s name and credit card number? A consumer who 
experiences exposure of information has the power to render 
some of that information useless, such as by cancelling the 
breached credit card and opening a new line. In fact, there 
are some indications that American consumers “have become 
numb to breaches altogether, accepting them as a practical 
inevitability of entering the marketplace,” experiencing what 
one commentator calls “data breach fatigue.”174 At the same 
time, potentially legitimate privacy concerns are not being 
addressed because companies are not being held accountable 
for simply the exposure of this information. Courts should 
address when mere exposure can itself be harmful and a 
violation of a privacy right. 
Courts currently distinguish amongst different categories 
of personal identifiable information and weigh their 
 
174 Foresman, supra note 23, at 349 & n.56 (citing Sarah Halzack, 
Home Depot and JPMorgan Are Doing Fine. Is It a Sign We’re Numb to 
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comparative value: credit card numbers versus social 
security numbers, for example. Courts recognize that some 
information is more private than others. A California 
magistrate judge in a recent data breach case ruled that the 
plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient injury because the 
information stolen was not deemed important enough.175 
This holding came from a situation in which Uber’s 
database, which included the names and driver’s license 
information of its drivers, was hacked by an unknown 
person.176 The court examined doctrine in Krottner, Clapper, 
and Reimijas, and ultimately ruled based on the type of 
information stolen alleged in the complaint: “[w]ithout a 
hack of information such as social security numbers, account 
numbers, or credit card numbers, there is no obvious, 
credible risk of identity theft that risks real, immediate 
injury.”177 
Data, especially information connected to credit cards, 
should perhaps be reimagined to fit today’s reality. Credit 
card use is the main mode of commerce and how people 
operate in the marketplace. This point can cut both ways. To 
facilitate the ease of electronic transactions, everyone 
participates in the sharing of information—consumers 
supply it, and companies read and store it as needed. As 
such, perhaps all have waived a strong privacy right to this 
information out of necessity in consenting to and 
participating in this system. On the other hand, perhaps 
because everyone uses this mode of payment, personal 
information should be protected even more rigorously. The 
number of people at risk is significant, since it encompasses 
just about everyone who participates in the modern economy. 
The courts have already begun to think about and discuss 
the potential consequences of exposure of different types of 
 
175 See Magistrate Dismisses Former Uber Driver’s Class Action Over 
Data Breach, supra note 163. 
176 Id. 
177 Antman v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. 3:15-CV-01175, 2015 WL 6123054, 
at *11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2015). Also note that though Uber’s motion to 
dismiss was granted, the plaintiff was given twenty-eight days to amend 
his complaint. 
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data; surely, they could also think about the different types 
of privacy harms that could result from the exposure of these 
varying types of data. It would be an interconnected and 
analogous issue. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In sum, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Remijas is 
instrumental in paving the way towards a solution to the 
data breach problem. The Seventh Circuit granted standing 
based on victims’ reasonable allegations of increased risk of 
future harms due to data breach.178 In other words, a circuit 
court held that claims of potential future damage satisfied 
the “injury in fact” requirement for the first time after 
Clapper. The Seventh Circuit recently followed its ruling in 
Remijas in deciding to reverse and remand the district 
court’s denial of standing in Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China 
Bistro, Inc.179 This is particularly significant since Clapper 
chilled the willingness of some district courts to grant 
standing. The Ninth Circuit has historically followed a 
similar approach to the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in 
Remijas. In contrast, the Third Circuit does not grant 
standing based on claims of increased risk of future harm in 
the data breach context. This circuit split indicates a 
willingness on the part of some courts of appeals to allow 
plaintiffs to overcome some of the traditional barriers to 
litigation for data breach victims. The Seventh Circuit is 
taking the right step in remedying and recognizing a very 
real harm—the exposure of private information and the 
potential harm that can flow from the misuse of it. However, 
 
178 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696–97 (7th 
Cir. 2015). 
179 Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., No. 14-3700, 2016 WL 
1459226, at *3 (7th Cir. Apr. 14, 2016) (“[The plaintiffs] describe the same 
kind of future injuries as the Remijas plaintiffs did: the increased risk of 
fraudulent charges and identity theft they face because their data has 
already been stolen.”).  
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there are practical consequences to this approach that should 
be addressed. 
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit’s decision signals that the 
onus of responsibility for data protection should be put on 
the company. The company is implicitly assigned a duty of 
care to protect consumer information and employees’ 
personal information. Yet, in some ways this seems unfair 
since there are no clear regulations on the issue. Moreover, 
there are some cases in which the company did everything 
right, but still experienced a breach. It seems unfair to put 
responsibility on companies when the government has not 
necessarily been able to prosecute criminals who commit 
data breach crimes. Furthermore, data breach also involves 
many different parties, including merchant companies, credit 
card companies, card-issuing financial institutions, and 
insurers. Holding the company liable does not necessarily 
incentivize it to better protect data in some cases, since 
credit card companies and financial institutions are often 
covering the damages associated with compensating data 
breach consumer victims. Lastly, the Seventh Circuit’s 
approach does not adequately address the fact that 
lawmakers need to consider what data privacy means in 
today’s world, where just about every economic transaction 
involves the exchange of personal information in some way. 
The courts have not yet addressed the inherent privacy harm 
in data breach cases. 
Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s approach is not without its 
challenges. It is difficult in application because data breach 
is a complicated problem. Yet, this approach is necessary in 
order to apply pressure to the players that matter: private 
companies. The Seventh Circuit’s approach pushes away 
from the current status quo of data breach law, which favors 
defendant companies.180 Only when companies, and by 
extension, credit card and insurance companies, bear the 
costs for data breach will broad-based legislation in this 
arena take form. Ultimately, data breach is probably best 
 
180 See Richie, supra note 170, at 17. 
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addressed through a regulatory framework.181 Change can 
indeed move in this manner; we have seen this before in 
history in the food and drug arena.182 In the area of data 
breach, the most important changes will likely occur through 
legislation and regulation.183 
There may be no need for a whole new agency.184 A 
solution can be implemented through an existing body, since 
companies in the United States are already fairly heavily 
regulated. The FTC has already taken on this role in some 
cases.185 The federal government must set standards for 
companies to follow to make sure companies are being held 
accountable for protecting consumer data. These baseline 
standards should be updated as technology changes. In 
addition, because of the nature of technology and because of 
the pervasiveness of data breach occurrences, data security 
needs to be interwoven as part of the fiduciary duty of 
company boards of directors. Boards can decide how best to 
provide for the safety of their data within the context of 
enforced baseline regulations. Lastly, in addition to a 
streamlined regulatory approach, this issue requires creative 
prosecutorial work and international cooperation to target 
hackers harming American companies from abroad. This is 
especially important in light of new information showing 
that some hacks are not the work of a lone wolf, but instead 
might be part of large conspiracies designed to manipulate 
markets and execute securities fraud.186 
Though the direction of the Seventh Circuit in granting 
standing to data breach victims poses practical challenges 
that the legal system, the legislature, and private companies 
are not yet ready to face, it is an essential step in the right 
 
181 Cave, supra note 50, at 789–90. 
182 See generally Chen, supra note 139. 
183 Richie, supra note 170, at 17. 
184 Cave, supra note 50, at 790. 
185 See Davis et al., supra note 30, at 633; see also Richie, supra note 
170, at 17. There are also indications that the FTC looks favorably upon 
the Remijas decision. See Clapper and Remijas: A Footnote in the Door for 
Data Breach Plaintiffs, supra note 60, at 10. 
186 Moyer, supra note 160. 
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direction. As mentioned above, a possible solution to the data 
breach problem will likely come in the form of a broad, 
overarching federal regulatory framework. This potential 
solution, however, is unattainable until more courts follow 
the Seventh Circuit’s approach and readily grant standing to 
data breach class actions. 
